

# WHAT WORKS: LESSONS IN THE USE OF CASH TRANSFERS

## Annotated Bibliography

*In alphabetical order by author*

### WHAT IS THE PROMISING PRACTICES DATABASE?

The Promising Practices Database was created in 2015 to collate evaluations of anti-slavery and counter-trafficking programs in a searchable format, so that stakeholders can quickly identify what works — and what does not — through a simple search by country, target population, type or sector of slavery, or type of intervention. The theory is that we can learn from the evaluations already undertaken, even if the learning is ‘there is a lot we don’t know.’ The Database is currently undergoing an update to include program evaluations published since 2015, due for release in mid-2020. The information in this annotated bibliography is current as of December 31, 2015

#### **The Progresa program (Angelucci, 2004; de Janvry et al, 2006; Stecklov et al, 2005; Rosati et al, 2012)**

The *Progresa* (later renamed *Oportunidades*) program in Mexico successfully decreased child labour and increased school attendance. *Progresa* is a national conditional cash transfer program which began in 1997 to reduce child labour by making transfers to vulnerable families in rural villages (de Janvry, 2006). These transfers were conditional on families meeting specific health and school attendance outcomes for their children (Rosati et al, 2012). Several evaluations in the *Database* analysed the data from this program to identify its impact on child labour, migration, access to education, and school attendance. The program included an independent impact evaluation, with longitudinal survey data, which allowed these evaluations to draw robust conclusions about the program’s effectiveness. The program was able to decrease the probability of child labour in response to an unemployment shock, however it was not able to mitigate the risk of child labour in response to illness or natural disaster shocks.

Angelucci, M 2004, [Aid and Migration: an analysis of the impact of Progresa on the timing and size of labour migration](#), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [accessed 15/04/2020].

de Janvry, A, Finan, F, Sadoulet, E, & Vakis, R 2006, ‘Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Serve as Safety Nets in Keeping Children at School and From Working When Exposed to Shocks?’ [Journal of Development Economics](#) vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 349-373. [accessed 15/04/2020].

Stecklov, G, Winters, P, Stampini, M, & Davis, B 2005 ‘[Do Conditional Cash Transfers Influence Migration? A Study Using Experimental Data from the Mexican PROGRESA Program](#)’ *Demography* vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 769-790. [accessed 15/04/2020].

Rosati, F C, Ranzani, M, Guarcello, L, Lyon, S, Breglia, M G, & Campos, P 2012, [The Mexican experience in reducing child labour: Empirical evidence and policy lessons](#), Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) Programme. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **School Attendance, Child Labor and Cash Transfers: An Impact Evaluation of PANES (Amarante, Ferrando, and Vigorito, 2011).**

In Uruguay, the PANES program operated a conditional cash transfer component entitled '*Ingreso Ciudadano*', which sought to reduce child labour and increase school attendance. The transfers included a monthly 'citizen income' or '*Ingreso ciudadano*' of US\$56 which equalled approximately half the average income self-reported by households before project implementation. Furthermore, larger households with children or pregnant women were eligible to receive electronic debit cards for food. The value of these cards varied from US\$13 to US\$30. The evaluation assessed the program's impact on child labour and school attendance through surveys conducted two months following the project's conclusion and employed regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference approaches to analyse the data.

The program did not have an impact on child labour or school attendance, and evaluators suggested redesigning the program to influence outcomes at the household level by either increasing transfer sizes, providing incentives for completion, or varying transfers in relation to household size.

Amarante, V, Ferrando, M. and Vigorito, A 2011, [School Attendance, Child Labor and Cash Transfers: An Impact Evaluation of PANES](#), PIERI Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research Network. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **What Happens Once the Intervention Ends? The Medium-Term Impacts of a Cash Transfer Experiment in Malawi (Baird et al, 2015).**

In Malawi, the *Zomba Cash Transfer Programme* involved both conditional and non-conditional cash transfers. The objectives of the program were to improve welfare, delay marriage and encourage school attendance for girls, and to generate research to understand the impact of cash transfer programs. The evaluation, entitled the 'Schooling, Income and Health Risk (SIHR)' study incorporated randomised control trials, baseline and follow up longitudinal data to evaluate the impact of the project on outcomes from education to health to sexual behaviour. The program analysed both CCTs and NCTs two and five years from baseline, and found that while at two years after project end, CCTs were more successful in improving school outcomes, NCTs were more successful in reducing teen pregnancies and early marriage. However, at five years after project end, these results tended to disappear suggesting that teen pregnancies and early marriage were only delayed, but not prevented.

Baird, S, Ephraim, C, McIntosh, C, & Özler, B 2015, [What Happens Once the Intervention Ends? The Medium-Term Impacts of a Cash Transfer Experiment in Malawi](#), 3ie International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **The Impact Of Cash Transfers On Child Labor And School Attendance In Brazil (Cardosa and Souza, 2004).**

The Bolsa Escola Federal program is a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil which sought to increase school attendance and reduce child labour. The program utilised data from a national census in 2000 at a micro household level, in conjunction with propensity score methods in order to examine the impact of conditional transfers on achieving the objectives to reduce child labour and increase school attendance. The program was found to have no significant effect on child labour, but did increase school attendance, perhaps due to the small size of the transfer.

Cardosa, E, & Portela Souza, A 2004, [The Impact Of Cash Transfers On Child Labor And School Attendance In Brazil](#), Vanderbilt University Department of Economics. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **The Effect of Conditional Transfers on School Performance and Child Labor: Evidence from an Ex-Post Impact Evaluation in Costa Rica (Duryea and Morrison, 2004).**

The *Superémonos* program is a conditional cash transfer providing food coupons to families in poverty in Costa Rica. While there was no specific objective to reduce the incidence of child labour, the evaluation itself included an analysis of the program's impact on child labour (Duryea and Morrison, 2004). The evaluation was based on three different means of analysis, including simple data comparison, regression analysis, and propensity score matching to measure the change in school attendance, performance and child labour as could be attributed to the project. The program was found to have a positive effect on school attendance, but did not materially affect school performance or reduce the likelihood of child labour.

Duryea, S & Morrison, A 2004, [The Effect of Conditional Transfers on School Performance and Child Labor: Evidence from an Ex-Post Impact Evaluation in Costa Rica](#), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Poverty Alleviation and Child Labour (Edmonds and Shady, 2012).**

The *Bono de Desarrollo (BDH)* program was a non-conditional cash transfer scheme. It was paid to randomly assigned poor families, while others in the target area who did not receive a transfer were used as a control group. The transfers involved monthly payments of US\$15 to female heads of household, which accounted for seven percent of monthly expenditure. The evaluation included a sample of 1,488 randomly selected households and conducted baseline and follow up surveys. These surveys inform the basis of this report. The program led to a 78 per cent decline in child labour outside the home among all participants, and 41 per cent decline for participants who were still children at baseline. Inside the home, child labour decreased by 32 per cent.

Edmonds, E V & Schady, N 2012, 'Poverty Alleviation and Child Labour' [American Economic Journal: Economic Policy](#) vol.4, no.4, pp, 100-124. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Towards a child labour-free Philippines: Building on past gains and addressing challenges (Jersild and Lazo, 2013).**

In the Philippines, the *Program Against Child Labour* provided vulnerable families with a conditional cash transfer and offered technical support and vocational training for project staff. The project's goal was to reduce the worst forms of child labour by 75 per cent. The project evaluation involved desk review of project documents, stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions, and a comparison of project achievements prior to and following program implementation. The program was successful in reducing 75 per cent of child labour, however other stated goals such as using data generated by the program to inform policy, were not met.

Jersild, A & Lazo, L 2013, [Towards a child labour-free Philippines: Building on past gains and addressing challenges](#), International Labour Organisation. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Educational and Child Labour Impacts of Two Food-for-Education Schemes: Evidence from a Randomised Trial in Rural Burkina Faso (Kazianga, Walque and Alderman, 2012).**

In Burkina Faso, the evaluation is of two conditional, transfer-in-kind programs, which had the aim of reducing child labour and increasing school attendance. One program targeted schoolgirls from low income families in the rural north and provided them with 10kgs of cereal flour per month if the girls had a 90 per cent school attendance rate. The other program in the same region was provided to both boys and girls and involved giving children free school meals. The evaluation of the programs assessed for impact on child labour through a randomised control trial. The program increased school enrolment by 4 - 5 per cent, and had some impact on reducing child labour on farms which were potentially incompatible with school hours.

Kazianga, H, de Walque, D & Alderman, H 2012, 'Educational and Child Labour Impacts of Two Food-for-Education Schemes: Evidence from a Randomised Trial in Rural Burkina Faso' [Journal of African Economies](#) vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 723-760. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Cash Transfers and Children's Education and Labour among Malawi's Poor (Miller and Tsoka, 2012)**

This 2012 evaluation assessed the impact of Malawi's national social cash transfer scheme. The program worked on the assumption that when households receive cash injections, there is less need for children to work, and therefore child labour will decrease as school attendance increases. The evaluation focussed on whether parents invest in education when they receive a transfer even when this investment is optional. The evaluation included a randomised control trial with surveys pre- and post- implementation, and used control groups for comparison. It was found that the program decreased child labour by 10 per cent for children who received the benefit. Further, these children were five per cent more likely to be enrolled in school, higher educational perspectives, and have fewer absences from school than their peers.

Miller, C & Tsoka, M 2012 'Cash Transfers and Children's Education and Labour among Malawi's Poor' [Development Policy Review](#) vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 499-522. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Creating the enabling environment to establish models for child labour free areas in Kenya (Nycander and Riechi, 2013).**

An International Labour Organisation project in Kenya sought to create child labour free areas, which included training for service providers and government officials, advocacy, awareness raising, technical support for government, and conditional cash transfers. The evaluation did not focus upon the impact of conditional cash transfers and the project description was ambiguous as to whether the assistance to young people to engage in commercial 'cash crops' (such as coffee, cassava, tea and mira, rice, sisal, and tobacco) was akin to a conditional cash transfer. The evaluation recommended that conditional cash transfers be implemented in future. The evaluation was based on a desk review, interviews with stakeholders, and focus group discussions. The program led to significant numbers of children being prevented and removed from child labour at 3,857 and 4,409 respectively, and directly financially supported 1,557 families of child labourers. The results surpassed targets on all counts except for the targeting of boys and girls for 'protection' or safety in workplaces.

Nycander, L & Riechi, A 2013, [Creating the enabling environment to establish models for child labour free areas in Kenya - Final evaluation](#), International Labour Organisation. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor (Edmonds and Shrestha, 2013).**

In Nepal, the *Sponsored Education Program* implemented by the GoodWeave Foundation incorporated a conditional transfer program which sought to increase school attendance and reduce the incidence of children weaving rugs. The program involved three groups; Group A, who received no support but were monitored, Group B, who received education related scholarships up to a capped limit, and Group C who received a regular stipend, which was a third of the cash earnings a child working in weaving would make, provided as credit in a local food shop. Group C also received further benefits if they regularly went to school. The program ran for one school year. The evaluation was based on data collected prior to, during, and after project implementation, and included comparison groups, and statistical controls. The program did not materially increase school attendance but did improve school performance and children who received the benefit were 48 per cent less likely to have worked as a carpet weaver. However, the program was more effective for girls than boys, as girls were 64 per cent less likely to weave while receiving the benefit.

Edmonds, E V & Shrestha, M 2013, 'You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor' [Journal of Development Economics](#) vol. 111, pp. 196-211. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **Achievements and Shortfalls of Conditional Cash Transfers: Impact Evaluation of Paraguay's Tekoporã Programme (Soares, Ribas and Hirata, 2008).**

The *Tekoporã* program was a conditional cash transfer program in Paraguay, which was also contingent on increasing school attendance and health levels in children. The aim of the program was to encourage children attending school, increase health levels through promoting check-ups and immunisations, while also reducing child labour. The program had reached over 4,300 households by June 2006. The evaluation included the survey data of 1,401 households and utilised existing statistical data such as the Index of Quality of Life to assess the program through a propensity score matching method. The program had no impact on child labour, however the program did have positive effects on school attendance and performance, household expenditure, household savings, agricultural production investments, and vegetable cultivation.

Soares, F V, Ribas, R, & Hirata, G 2008, [Achievements and Shortfalls of Conditional Cash Transfers: Impact Evaluation of Paraguay's Tekoporã Programme](#), International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. [accessed 15/04/2020].

### **The Impact of School Quality on Child Labour and School Attendance: The Case of CONAFE Compensatory Education Program (Rosati and Rossi, 2007)**

The Compensatory Education Program (CONAFE) implemented in Mexico included the provision of conditional cash transfers to teachers and principals in schools with more than six teachers, and to school supervisors to improve the quality of school programs. The aim of the program was to encourage school attendance and reduce child labour. The evaluation compared the CONAFE dataset to the *Oportunidades* surveys and compared the impact of both programs on reducing child labour. The CONAFE program did not have an impact on school attendance for young children aged 8 – 11 years, but the program did increase school attendance for children aged 12 to 16 years, and reduced child labour among this group.

Rosati, F C & Rossi, M 2007, [The Impact of School Quality on Child Labour and School Attendance: The Case of CONAFE Compensatory Education Program](#), Understanding Children's Work (UCW) Programme. [accessed 15/04/2020].